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FOUNDATION REGULATION IN OUR AGE OF IMPACT
DanaBrakman Reiser*

The Tax Reform Act of 19691 has had remarkable influence on
American philanthropy in the past half century. Like most legislation-even
watershed legislation-though, the Act was a product of its time.
Fifty years on the complexion of charity has changed. One hallmark of
today's charitable sector is its preoccupation with impact. The act of giving
alone is no longer enough to count as success. The problems society faces
are too deep and too urgent. Charities, their donors, and even their regulators
today are increasingly interested in what an individual charity, the charitable
sector, or segments of it actually achieve with the resources they expend.
These demands for impact also call into question the tools of traditional
philanthropy and whether they are sufficient. For foundations, this means
considering whether grant-making should be supplemented by investment
practices designed to generate mission-aligned impact as well.
Although it did create the concept of a "program-related investment, "2
the 1969 Act did not envision foundations pursuing charitable impact through
their investments in a very substantial way. This meant its framers could not
plan sufficiently for how other pieces of the Act might frustrate these
activities. But they can. Some of the difficulties have been ameliorated by
the Treasury Department and the IRS through regulatory changes and
guidance. Still, foundation adoption of values-aligned investing is slower
than might be expected, and some philanthropists are even turning to
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alternative (and less transparent) giving technologies to free up investment
flexibility.
This Article explores how the regulation of foundation investment might
respond to our age of impact. Part I describes the Act's provisions limiting
foundation business holdings and prohibiting jeopardizing investments. Part
II explores values-aligned investing in the private foundation context,
comparing the poles of program- and mission-related investment and their
unique places in the increasingly crowded values-aligned investing sector.
Part III identifies the remaining areas of mismatch between these impactoriented tools and the Act's regulatory framework, even after Treasury's best
updating efforts, and evaluates potential solutions. Part IV briefly concludes.
I. HOW THE 1969 ACT REGULATES FOUNDATION INVESTMENT

The key to the 1969 Act's provisions on exempt organizations was the
distinction it created between public charities and private foundations,3 the
latter of which are targeted by a series of new rules it enacted to more strictly
regulate them. 4 The distinction rests primarily on the source of an exempt
organization's financial support. 5 An organization is deemed a public charity
if it can identify a significant class of small donors or consumers of their
services. Those organizations supported primarily by a small group of large
donors and without active charitable operations were instead deemed private
foundations and ever since have been subject to a strict set of operational
restrictions.
These private foundation rules drew heavily on recommendations from
a 1965 Treasury Report pronouncing the foundation sector healthy overall
but identifying several areas of concern. 6 With only a few large donors
heavily enmeshed in each foundation's operations, these organizations were

I.R.C. § 509.
4 I.R.C. §§ 4940-4946.
5 I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1) & (2), and 170(b)(1)(A)(iv).
6 See S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE

FOUNDATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT] (describing Congress' request for
the report studying critiques of foundations as delaying the receipt of donated assets by actual operating
charities and their beneficiaries, diverting a large part of the economy to tax-exempt entities, and amassing
"dangerous concentrations of economic and social power").
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viewed as much more likely to become embroiled in transactions with their
donors and managers and excessively entangled with businesses (both related
and unrelated to their donors). Without active charitable programs, they
would also be prone to retain their resources and engage in overly active
trading and speculation. The Report concluded that abuses worthy of redress
were confined to a minority of foundations, but public and congressional
suspicion of foundations persisted.7 The congressional hearings on the 1969
Act included statements from vocal critics along with Treasury officials and
foundation leaders, and ultimately generated a comprehensive legislative
program to regulate private foundations.
The private foundation regime covers a great deal of ground. It
undermines foundation tax exemption by imposing a small tax on foundation
investment income. 9 It requires foundations to distribute 5% of their assets
annuallyo and imposes steep penalties on most transactions with donors and
insiders, political expenditures, and grants to non-public charities." It also
significantly impacts foundation investment decisions by limiting the stakes
foundations may hold in business entitieS' 2 and by penalizing investments
that might "jeopardize the carrying out" of a foundation's charitable
functions.1 3 The rest of this Part focuses attention on these investment
restrictions and their evolution over the last five decades.

See generally Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private FoundationLaw: HistoricalPerspective on
its Originsand Underpinnings, 27 ExEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 52 (2000).
'See id. at 58-62.
9 I.R.C. § 4940. Originally, this tax was set at 4%. It was reduced in 1978 to 2%. See MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 264-65 (2004). Tax legislation in 2017
reduced it further to 1.39%. See I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2019).
10

I.R.C.

§ 4942(e)(1).

The 1969 statute originally required foundations to payout all of their

adjusted net income or a minimum of 6%. See Comment, InternalRevenue Code Section 4942: Its Impact

on PrivateFoundations, 3 U. HAW. L. REV. 67, 82 (1981). The figure bounced around a bit before settling
at 5% in 1976. See id. at 82-83.
"See id.
12

See id.

13 Id.

§§

4941, 4945.

§ 4943.

§ 4944.
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A. Excess Business Holdings
Like many other provisions of the 1969 Act, the excess business
holdings section levies a two-tiered penalty tax on foundations that engage
in disfavored behavior.' 4 The 1965 Treasury Report provided several reasons
to disfavor excessive entanglements by foundations with business. In
addition to concerns that businesses affiliated with private foundations would
be advantaged over their competitors, they worried about mission drift.15
Concerns about a foundation's business holdings could unduly distract their
managers from their proper charitable focus, and Treasury worried that
"[b]usiness may become the end of the organization; charity, an
insufficiently considered and mechanically accomplished afterthought." 6 It
also warned that self-dealing problems and delays in distributing assets for
actual charitable programs intensified in foundations with considerable
business involvements, and particularly in those foundations with
investments in businesses linked to their donors.' 7 To combat these issues,
Treasury recommended a cap on the size of foundation holdings in any
particular business and anew rule disallowing deductions for gifts of interests
in controlled businesses until disposition of the asset, use of it by the
foundation in its charitable programs, or cessation of donor control.'
Congress ultimately took up only the first of these recommendations,
enacting excise penalties on foundation business holdings above a bright-line
cap. Foundations that exceed the limits imposed by the statute initially must
pay a tax set at 10% of the value of the excess holdings.1 9 If a recalcitrant
foundation fails to divest its excess holdings even after the application of the
initial tax, it must pay an additional tax of 200% of the holdings. 20 This
confiscatory tax is so high that no rational private foundation would ever pay
it. When faced with divesting their holdings, presumably for some value, or

" Id. § 4943(a)-(b).

15

See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 31-35.

16 Id. at 35.
1

See id. at 39-41.

1

See id. at 36-37, 41-42.

19

See I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1).

20 See id.

§ 4943(b).
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retaining them and paying twice their value in penalty taxes, the choice is
clear.
The regime, therefore, turns on the definition of "excess" business
holdings. These are defined as the holdings a foundation must divest to retain
only "permitted holdings.",21 Permitted holdings in a corporation are
generally any amount up to 20% of the voting stock, when combined with
holdings of substantial contributors, foundation managers, members of their
families, and related parties (including related foundations).2 2 Members of
these groups are categorized as "disqualified persons. '"23
Refinements on this proscription deal with variations in the control of
foundations' investee companies. If disqualified persons themselves do not
hold greater than 20% of the voting stock, the foundation can count any
nonvoting stock it holds as permitted holdings.24 And if a private foundation
can establish "that effective control of the corporation is in one or more
persons who are not disqualified persons with respect to the foundation," the
permitted holdings ceiling rises to 350%.25 There is also a de minimis rule,
whereby foundation
holdings of 2% or less of a corporation are per se not
26
excess holdings.
Because many foundations held substantial stakes in businesses, both
related and unrelated, at the time of the 1969 Act, the legislation initially
applied largely on a prospective basis. Foundations that already had holdings
in excess of the limit were temporarily grandfathered, and the law included

21 Id. §

4943(c)(1).

22 See id. § 4943(c)(2). The Act also includes provisions that apply similar restrictions on the

holdings of unincorporated businesses. See id § 4943(c)(3).
23I.R.C. §§ 4946(a), 4943(f)(4).
24Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
25See id. § 4943(c)(2)(B). Otherwise, blocks of nonvoting stock are not permitted holdings. This
language likely responds to the practice discussed in the 1965 Treasury report of using nonvoting stock
transactions to allow foundations to retain or transfer control of family businesses while also obtaining
valuable tax deductions. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 37-39.
26I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(C).

Pitt Tax Review I ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2020.111 I http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu

generous extensions and phase-in schedules. 2 7 Perhaps this generosity is
what has allowed the excess business holdings regime as enacted in 1969 to
remain largely intact. Only one significant exception has been attached,
when, in 2018, the Newman's Own Foundation finally obtained a longpursued exception. 28 The new language excepts from the regime's limitations
and penalties foundation holdings of 100% ownership stakes in a business
enterprise a foundation obtains other than by purchase (as did Newman's
Own Foundation), so long as the wholly-controlled business operates
independently of the foundation and donates all profits to charity.29 While
important for Newman's Own, this exception is extremely narrow and will
impact investment decisions for very few foundations. If anything, the
original Act's idea of limiting philanthropic organizations' involvement in
business has been extended. The 2006 Pension Protection Act applied
business holding restrictions patterned on the 1969 Act to donor-advised
funds and supporting organizations.30
B. JeopardizingInvestments
The 1969 Act's jeopardizing investment rule expanded a previous
prohibition on jeopardizing investments of accumulated income only.3 The
Treasury Report expressed a worry that foundations did not confine risky
investment practices to investments of accumulated income. 32 It
recommended a very broad prohibition on what it considered jeopardizing

27 See id. § 4943(c)(4)-(7). Treasury regulations further elaborate these matters
and provide
examples. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4943-2 to -7 and 53.4943-11 (as amended in 1986).

28 See Ana Radelat, Tax Bill Glitch EndangersFuture ofNewman's Own
andActor 'sFoundation,

CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 21, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/12/21/tax-bill-glitch-endangers-future-ofnewmans-own-and-actors-foundation/ (describing Newman's Own Foundation's failure to obtain an
exemption from the excess business holdings regime in the negotiations over the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs
Act). See also Ana Radelat, Budget Deal Has Plenty for Connecticut, CONN. MIRROR (Feb. 9, 2018),

https://ctmirror.org/2018/02/09/senate-stumbles-on-way-to-vote-on-budget-bill-with-plenty-for-ct/
(explaining the foundation's successful advocacy for such an exemption early the following year allowed
it to avoid the 200% confiscatory tax).
29

I.R.C.

§ 4943(g).

3o Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280,

§§

1231-33, 1241-43, 120 Stat. 1094 (2006).

3' TREASURY REPORT, supranote 6, at 24-25.
32 Id. at 25.
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investments, but Congress in the end enacted something a bit less extensive.
Treasury sought both the expansion Congress enacted as well as a complete
ban on "devices ordinarily deemed inherently speculative-as, for example,
the purchase of 'puts,' 'calls,' 'straddles,' 'spreads,' 'strips,' 'straps,' and
'special options,' selling short, and trading commodity futures. 3 3 These
practices, it opined, not only subjected charitable assets to inappropriate
levels of risk and distracted foundation managers from their charitable
missions, but raised the specter of "financial empire building."34
The ultimate jeopardizing investment rules Congress enacted swept
broadly but stopped short of banning specific types of investment activity.
Penalty taxes apply "[i]f a private foundation invests any amount in such a
manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes." 35
Unlike in the excess business holdings regime, which penalizes only the
offending organization, the jeopardizing investment regime imposes excise
taxes on both the organization (of 10% of the investment initially, 36 with a
potential additional 25% tax if the "investment is not removed from
jeopardy") 37 and on foundation managers who knowingly make such
investments. Managers face an initial tax of 10% of the offending investment,
381
with an additional 5% penalty on failure to cure.
Some language from the original Treasury Report proposal survives in
Treasury regulations defining jeopardizing investments. These rules
generally impose a standard of ordinary care and prudence, which is applied
on an investment-by-investment basis, but takes into account the
foundation's overall investment portfolio. 39 Still, the regulations call out
"[t]rading in securities on margin, trading in commodity futures, investments
in working interests in oil and gas wells, the purchase of 'puts,' 'calls,' and
'straddles,' the purchase of warrants, and selling short" as "types or methods

* Id. at 54.
* Id. at 53.
3

I.R.C. § 4944(a). See generally I.R.C. § 4944(b).

36 See I.R.C.
37

Id.

§ 4944(a)(1),

(b)(1).

§ 4944(b)(1).

31 See id.

§ 4944(a)(2),

39 See Treas. Reg.

(b)(2).

§ 53.49441(a)(2)(i).
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of investment which will be closely scrutinized" to determine compliance
with this standard."
Although both individual and aggregate taxes on managers are capped"
and they apply only to knowing violations, the prospect of personal liability
could loom large. Foundations with counsel or otherwise aware of its
provisions can be comforted by the fact that enforcement is light 42 and the
risk of personal liability can be avoided if the manager's participation in the
investment "is not willful and is due to reasonable cause." 43 This exculpatory
standard can often be met by relying on written advice of counsel that
determines the investment will not violate the jeopardizing investment
rules. Foundations do take advantage of this option and sometimes even
seek private letter rulings to ensure proper classification.45
1. The Exception for Program Related Investments
The single exception to the jeopardizing investment proscription blesses
"program-related

investments"

(PRIs). 46

Prominent members

of the

foundation community began developing this idea around the time of the Act.
The Ford Foundation created a $10 million program it called the "Program
Related Investment Account" in 1968, and first used it that year to make
loans to businesses and other entities in undercapitalized communities.4 7

40

Id.

4

Treas. Reg.

§ 53.4944-4(b).

42 See Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering PrivateFoundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L.

REV. 59, 108 (2004) (describing the provisions as "close to being deadwood"); see also Richard
Schmalbeck, The Lesser Foundation Excise Taxes: What Are They Good For? (Not Quite) Absolutely
Nothing, at 28-30 (2019 conference draft on file with author) (detailing a lack of enforcement breeding a
lack of concern among most foundations).

§ 4944(a)(2).
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(b)(2)(v).

4 I.R.C.
"

4 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Investing for Impact with Program-Related Investments, STAN. Soc.

INNOVATION REV. 19, 22-23 (2016) (describing the Gates Foundation's practice of seeking legal opinions
for every PRI). See also BENABENTOS

ET AL., STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE YOUR PHILANTHROPIC

CAPITAL: A GUIDE TO PROGRAM RELATED INVESTMENTS 17 (2012).

46 I.R.C.

§ 4944(c).

4 See Rachel Wimpee, The Economics ofEmpowerment: The Civil Rights Origins ofProgram-

Related Investments 6-7 (2019), https://cppp.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Wimpee-RachelWimpeeCivil-Rights-Origins-of-PRIs.pdf.
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Despite the potential that such efforts might violate existing legal commands
that foundations invest prudently, the Ford Foundation board approved its
program as a cost-effective route to achieving its community development
goals ."

The paper advocating the PRI approach to the Ford board suggested at
least two ways such investments could achieve a multiplier effect. First, they
would generate some returns-as opposed to outright grants that returned
nothing-which could be recycled into future philanthropic efforts.49
Second, foundation support could attract additional capital from sources
otherwise unwilling to lend into financially distressed communities. 50 John
Simon, of the Taconic Foundation and Yale Law School, had also been
advocating for foundations to use investments in addition to grants as a tool
for achieving their charitable objectives. 5 1 Simon recognized not only PRIs'
financial value, but also the expressive vote of confidence the use of
52
investments, rather than grants, could give marginalized communities.
Although not addressed in the initial Treasury Report or the House bill,
language supporting PRIs found its way into the Act through the Senate
Committee on Finance .53 Under the Act, program-related investments are
"investments, the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one or more
[charitable purposes], and no significant purpose of which is the production
of income or the appreciation of property., 54
Program-related investments receive special treatment in three different
ways, each of which has affected the trajectory of this tool. First, PRIs are
per se not jeopardizing investments. 55 This is important, as many PRIs will

48

Id. at 7-8.

9 See id.at8.
0

5 id.
51See id.

52See id. (citing a 1968 speech by Simon to the Council on Foundations).
51 S. COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, COMPILATION OF DECISIONS
REACHED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION 50, 57-58 (Comm. Print 1969).

5 I.R.C. § 4944(c). Regulations add that investments for lobbying and electioneering purposes
cannot qualify as PRIs. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(iii).
55See I.R.C. § 4944(c).
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offer higher risk and lower financial return than could be justified under a
prudent investor standard. From the earliest, pre-statute Ford Foundation
loans in financially depressed neighborhoods, to today's PRIs in high-risk
social-enterprise startups, PRIs are structured as investments because equity,
debt, revenue-based financing, or a loan guarantee is a superior device for
achieving charitable objectives, not because they offer an attractive financial
return. Consider that early Ford loan portfolio. It self-reported that these
investments generated a more than 35% default rate, a shockingly high rate
for foundation debt investments normally.56 By 1991, it had a mature PRI
program staffed by professional loan officers and still targeted only an 85%
recovery of funds. 7 A category of investments in which one expects negative
15% return certainly courts the imprudent label.
But PRIs were doing something quite different from the typical
foundation investing for which the jeopardizing investment prohibition was
conceived. Early on, according to a Ford Staffer, Ford's losses were greatest
when they "were making substantial loans to small enterprises run by
inexperienced entrepreneurs in the poorest neighborhoods."5 " They did so not
for financial return, but to pursue charitable objectives of economic and
community development in those neighborhoods. 5 9 As Ford's program
matured and it and others began to use the PRI technique as legislativelyprescribed, the idea that PRIs were a substitute not for other investments, but
for grants, remained strong.60
The second special statutory provision for PRIs makes this equivalency
explicit. A major prong of the 1969 Act is its mandatory distribution regime.
Under it, each private foundation must generally make "qualifying

56

See

FORD FOUND.,

INVESTING FOR SOCIAL GAIN: REFLECTIONS ON TWO DECADES

OF

PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTMENTS 14 (1991).

57

1Id. at 10-11.

51

Id. at 8 (quoting a Ford staffer).

59 See id at 4 ("[T]he medium of support fits the message of the Foundation's program goals,"
including "develop[ing] capacity within individuals and organizations") (quoting in part former Ford
trustee and PRI committee chair, Donald S. Perkins).
60 See, e.g., id. at 15 ("Certainly recovering 85% of a PRI from a project that accomplished
an
important program goal is less costly than if the total project had been supported with non-recoverable
grant funds") (quoting Ford's PRI Director at the time).
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distributions" of 5% of its assets each year.6 ' Failure to do so will trigger yet
another set of two-tiered penalty and confiscatory taxes on the organization.62
Qualifying distributions include "any amount paid to accomplish one or more
[exempt] purposes" of the foundation or "to acquire an asset used" in

carrying them out, so long as payments are not made to related entities or
other private foundations. 6 3 Treasury regulations clarify that program-related
investments fall within this definition.64 To summarize, meeting the
requirements of the PRI exception not only eliminates any risk of penalty
taxes on jeopardizing investments, but also allows a foundation to count the
PRI toward its mandatory 5% payout.6 5
The final regulatory consequence of qualifying as a program-related
investment relates to the excess business holdings restrictions addressed
above. Treasury regulations specifically exclude PIs from the definition of
a "business enterprise," holdings of which are limited by the regime. 66 Unlike
all other businesses, related or unrelated, foundations may hold large stakes,
majority stakes, even the entire equity of a business in which it makes a
program-related investment.
The exceptional treatment PRIs receive means a great deal can hinge on
the Act's one-sentence definition. Treasury regulations in 1972 provided
useful elaboration.67 For an investment's primary purpose to be considered
as accomplishing the charitable purposes of the foundation, the regulations
consider both how much the investment contributes to those purposes and a
question of but-for cause: whether the investment would have been made

61

I.R.C

62

Id.

§ 4942(e).

§ 4942(a)-(b).

§ 4942(g)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2).

63 Id.

64
Of course, ifaPRI generates returns, those assets will increase
the foundation's overall assets and its future required 5% distributions. Notably, however, if the principal
of a PRI loan is returned or a PRI equity investment is liquidated for a gain, these amounts are added
directly to the foundation's minimum distribution amount for the year. See I.R.C. § 4942(d), (f)(2)(C).
65

For a discussion challenging the Act's treatment of grants and PRIs as equivalent, see Ray D.

Madoff, The Five PercentFig Leaf 17 PITT. TAX REv. 341 (2020).
66 See Treas. Reg.

§ 53.4943-10(b).

67 They also clarify that PRIs cannot be made to influence legislation or participate or intervene in
elections. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii).
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without this contribution .68 They also clarify that the mere fact that an
investment ultimately produces a high return does not preclude its
qualification as a PRI. 69 But whether investors concerned solely with
financial return would make the same investment is "relevant" in determining
if a proposed PRI appropriately lacks an income-seeking or propertyappreciation purpose.70
These initial regulations also provided ten examples illustrating
Treasury's understanding of PRIs at the time. Six of the nine examples that
successfully meet the PRI requirements involve loans with below-market
rates or other below-market terms made to low-income individuals or firms
that are either owned by members of economically depressed or
disadvantaged communities or the operation of which is important to such
communities. 71 Two more involve equity or unspecified "investment" in
similar entities or projects, 72 and the last simply allows a PRI's terms to be
changed over time to protect the foundation's investment without losing its
classification. 73 The examples could not be more clear. At the time of
enactment, and for decades following, PRIs were investments traditional
investors would avoid, ones made in businesses or individuals lacking access
to capital, and ones generally involving marginalized communities or
geographies.
As creative vehicles for social investments flourished, pressure grew for
Treasury to update these examples. In 2016, after nearly fifteen years of

68

Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (explaining an investment will have the required primary

purpose "if it significantly furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and
if the investment would not have made but for such relationship between the investment and the
accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities").
69 Id. §

53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii).

70Id.
71 Id. § 53.4944-3(b), ex. (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (9), (10). The final, negative example underscored
that equity investments in firms unrelated to the foundation's exempt purposes would not qualify, even if
the proceeds were applied to fund foundation's exempt activities. See id. § 53.4943-3(b), ex. (7).
72 Id. § 53.4944-3(b), ex. (3), (10).
73 Id. § 53.4944-3(b), ex. (8).
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advocacy by the nonprofit legal community," it added nine new and more
wide-ranging examples." These examples bring within the PRI definition not
only traditional debt or equity investments, but hybrid models and loan
guarantees, and expressly approve a PRI with a potentially high rate of
return. 76 They also focus more than the original ten on hypothetical
investments' risk-adjustedrate of return as the relevant inquiry. Still, the core
idea of PRIs as investments only worth making for their social or charitable
value remains. Like their predecessors, the new examples continually
mention-so often it becomes almost a mantra-that qualifying PRIs are
made on below-market terms and lack appeal to conventional investors.
II. VALUES-ALIGNED INVESTNG

The idea of aligning one's investments with one's values has purchase
today far beyond the confines of private foundations. ESG investing, in
which investments are selected not only for financial risk and return profiles
but also based on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors, is
growing at a staggering rate globally. Estimates pegged the share of assets
under management using ESG factors in 2019 at nearly $30 trillion.7 " For
many investors today, the turn to consider ESG factors is in part motivated
by a desire for long-term investment growth or stability that appears
associated with firms that outpace their peers on these factors. 7 9 Negative

" See I.R.S. Pub. No. 4344, Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (ACT):
Report of Recommendations 8 (2009) (referencing the work of the PRI Task Force, and its
recommendation that new examples be added in 2002).
" See T.D. 9762, 2016-19 I.R.B. 718.
76

See Treas. Reg.

§ 53.4944-3(b),

ex. (11)-(19).

" See id.
7

See Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion Market

Just GettingStarted, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/yourcomplete-guide-tosocially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/4HZC-FLJ5]; see Gregory Elders et al., Sustainable
Investing Grows on Pensions, Millennials, BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www

.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/sustainable-investing-grows-pensions-millennials/ (noting that global
estimates include investments "labeled as sustainable, responsible or ethical investing" and amounted to
$23 trillion in prior years and citing to estimates provided by the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance).
7 See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne M. Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG
and EDG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921 (2020).
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investment screens that eschew or divest from "sin" or "vice" stocks or fossil
fuels have been on the scene for some time, as niche investment vehicles.s
The field today, though, includes a panoply of additional techniques to
incorporate ESG factors, including various positive screening mechanisms to
identify best-in-class or improving ESG firms, themed ESG investment
vehicles composed of green tech or woman-led firms, and both active and
passive mutual fund and ETF options."' The ability to feel good about one's
investment portfolio is a psychic bonus and can be a powerful marketing tool
for investment companies designing ESG products.82
Private foundations were some of the first to identify the appeal of this
type of investment-though for different reasons. As philanthropic entities
legally and practically devoted to pursuing charitable purposes, but which
also often manage considerable investment portfolios, early adopters saw
values-aligned investing as a natural fit. It is still, however, far from the
standard investment strategy for private foundations.83 This relatively low
level of penetration can be traced to many factors, but the regulatory
framework for foundations staked out in the 1969 Act is surely one of them.
The legal framework outlined above has led foundations' values-aligned
investment activity to be cleaved into two separate camps: program-related
investments and mission-related investments. As the 1969 Act and its
accompanying regulations envisioned, program-related investments are
viewed as part of the grant-making side of the foundation. Like grants, PRIs
are made to generate gains for the foundation's charitable objectives. They
effectively substitute for grant-making but involve a possible financial return
as opposed to the 100% financial loss expected from traditional grants. That
said, expected risk-adjusted financial returns from PRIs are typically low. 4
Their expected returns are so low, in fact, that they would frequently be
intolerable under the jeopardy investment rules-even as part ofa diversified

8o See Casey C. Clark & Andy Kirkpatrick, Impact Investing Under the Uniform PrudentInvestor
Act, 32 PROBATE & PROP. 32, 33 (2018).
8

See Brakman Reiser & Tucker, supra note 79, at 1930-34.

82

See id. at 1992-98.

See Heng Qu & Una Osili, Beyond Grantmaking: An Investigation of Program-Related
Investments by U.S. Foundations, 46 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 305, 308 (2017) (noting the
83

use of PRIs by "only a handful of foundations" each year).
8

See Brest, supra note 45, at 19 ("[F]oundations do not expect PRIs to produce market-rate

returns").
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endowment portfolio. PRIs would also sometimes run afoul of the excess
business holdings rules, as the investment needed to seed a small business in
a struggling neighborhood or scale a startup social enterprise developing
environmentally- or socially-focused products will sometimes represent
more than a minority stake. Thus, the special exceptions provide cover.
While the 1969 Act literally coined the term PRI, it did not contemplate
mission-related investments, which substitute for other investments-not
grants. Mission-related investments fall within the purview of the
endowment side of the foundation and are intended to generate financial
returns for the foundation, though not financial returns alone. A missionrelated investment will also provide returns aligned with the foundation's
mission-or in the view of some MRI adopters, at least not conflict with or
frustrate those objectives. A foundation with a health-related charitable
mission might invest in a biotech fund or purchase bonds issued by a fitness
company, but it might also avoid investments in major packaged food
companies or heavy polluters.
Mission-related investments can occur across industries and asset
classes and require a foundation to identify its mission and how it desires to
pursue that mission through its investment activities. As socially responsible
investing has matured, new strategies have emerged for which risk adjusted
returns will match or even exceed traditional investments. 5 Some investing
choices made to align a portfolio with a foundation's values, however, will
involve tradeoffs in terms of risk and financial return, and any decision to
impose a mission-related screen on investments can impact diversification.
As such, federal tax law's jeopardizing investment prohibition is relevant
when considering individual MRIs and-even more so-adopting an MRI
policy for all or part of a foundation's endowment.8 6 Recall that the 1969 Act
imposes penalties on foundations and their managers if the foundation

85 See Brakman Reiser & Tucker, supra note 79, at 1934-35; Susan N. Gary, Best
Interests in the
Long Term: FiduciaryDuties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REv. 731, 747-63 (2019).
86 Such decisions also raise questions of compliance with state law fiduciary obligations to invest
foundation assets prudently. See Gary, supra note 85, at 784-94 (arguing ESG integration investment
strategies will comply with charitable trustees' state law fiduciary obligations); Susan N. Gary, Is It

Prudentto Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing

and Mission Investing, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 106 (2011) (discussing these state law compliance issues
in socially responsible and mission investing).
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"invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of
any of its exempt purposes."" Although the regulations embrace portfolio
theory and diversification, the penalties are still assessed based on
investment-by-investment review. Mission-related investments that take on
greater risk or contemplate lower return than alternative investment choices
once appeared almost a facial violation of these rules.
True-believing early adopters of MRI, like the like the $270M Heron
Foundation, which began moving its endowment to MRI in the mid-1990s
and started 2017 with an endowment 100% committed to mission,"" had
shown it is possible. But for more foundations to jump in, reassurance was
necessary. It came in the form of a 2015 Treasury Bulletin, which clarified
that:
When exercising ordinary business care and prudence in deciding whether to
make an investment, foundation managers may consider all relevant facts and
circumstances, including the relationship between a particular investment and the
foundation's charitable purposes. Foundation managers are not required to select
only investments that offer the highest rates of return, the lowest risks, or the
greatest liquidity so long as the foundation managers exercise the requisite
ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and circumstances prevailing
at the time of the investment in making investment decisions that support, and do
notjeopardize, the furtherance of the private foundation's charitable purposes."

Endowments must shift slowly, and it is too early to draw conclusions
about the fate of mission-related investment, but highly public moves by a
few large foundations in the wake of this guidance are encouraging. In 2017,
the Ford Foundation announced that over the next ten years it would shift of
up to one billion of its $12 billion endowment to MRI, 90 in part in response

87

I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1).

88 See The Evolution of Heron, HERON FOUND.,

https://www.heronorg/enterprise (last visited

Jan. 26, 2020).
89 I.R.S. Notice 2015-62, 2015-39 I.R.B. 411 [hereinafterTreasuryGuidance]. Although this article
focuses on federal tax law regulation of foundations, it is worth noting that similar trends appear in state
law addressing charitable fiduciaries' responsibility to invest prudently. See generally UNIF. PRUDENT

MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT

§§

3(a), (e)(1)(H) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State

Laws 2006).
90 Darren Walker, Unleashing the Power of Endowments: The Next Great Challenge for
Philanthropy, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/

ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/unleashing-the-power-of-endowments-the-next-great-challenge-forphilanthropy/.
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to the guidance's resolution of the "legal uncertainty" that been an obstacle
before. 9 1 The following year Nathan Cummings Foundation "committed to
align all of [its nearly half-billion endowment] assets for impact. "92
III. UNFINISHED IMPACT BusINEss
New regulatory examples and guidance have done a great deal to update
the 1969 Act and make foundations more comfortable exploring ways to
invest for impact. But more could be done. This Part explores the advantages
and disadvantages of additional changes that could increase the use of PRIs
and mission-related investing, as well as other means to introduce more
impact thinking into foundation regulation.
A. IncreasingPRI Uptake
Only a small number of foundations regularly engage in PRIs, and
together these foundations allocate a very small amount of total funds to such
investments.9 3 At least two explanations for this lack of uptake are plausible.
On the one hand, it may be due to uncertainty: that it is still too hard or too
risky to make PRIs. On the other hand, the lack of PRIs may instead be the
result instead of good decision-making. Perhaps PRIs are not a good use of
more foundation assets.
1. Uncertainty
Despite the new 2016 examples, reports of foundation managers'
reticence surrounding program-related investing and that of their counsel
persist. The practice of seeking written opinions of counsel to ensure a PRI's

91Id.

92 See NATHAN CUMMINGS FOUND., Nathan Cummings Foundation Announces Move to 100
PercentMission-Aligned Investing (Mar. 12, 2018), http://www.nathancummings.org/ncf-commits-100-

percent (quoting Board Chair Ruth Cummings).
9' See, e.g., Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of Restricted-Spending
Philanthropy,93 WASH. U. L. REv. 1143, 1148, 1198 (2016) (finding that in a data set of thousands of

foundations over 25 years "barely one tenth of 1% of foundation assets is given over to" PRIs); Marc
Gunther, Doing Good and Doing Well, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.philanthropy

.com/article/Impact-Investing-Struggles-to/245390 (summing up its findings about slow uptake of impact
investing with: "[t]he bottom line is that less than three-tenths of Ipercent of the endowments of those 15
big foundations are invested in ways designed to align with missiof').
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charitability continues,9 4 in part because the world of creative investment
vehicles simply moves far more swiftly than do regulatory changes.
Recommendations along the lines of the new 2016 examples were first
submitted by a special task force in 2002.95 Although the legal community
welcomed the eventual updates, the new examples described transactions
that, by the time of their release, no longer represented the cutting edge. The
additional examples did make the important point that credit enhancements
could qualify as PRIs,96 but other scenarios they describe are similar to those
addressed by existing private letter rulings.9 7 Foundations wishing to make
the most novel and potentially transformative PRIs thus still face regulatory
risk when doing so, as do their managers. The costs associated with reducing
this risk are particularly trenchant because of the small deal sizes PRIs
typically involve. 98 Foundations understandably reel at spending tens of
thousands of dollars to "paper" a deal whose investment size is only
$100,000, and PRIs often involve far smaller amounts.
If this explanation is accepted, how might the Act and its accompanying
regulations be changed or interpreted to resolve the problem? Tax law
commonly utilizes safe harbors to mitigate risk and uncertainty in
transactions that have the potential to be both valuable and problematic. For
example, the regime regulating transactions between public charities and
related persons relies on a safe harbor. 99 In that context, the law's objective
is to screen out self-dealing transactions that harm public charities,
particularly by taking advantage of insiders' access to or control over them.

9

See PROGRAM-RELATED

INVESTING:

SKILLS

&

STRATEGIES FOR NEW

PRI FUNDERS,

GRANTCRAFT 4 (2018) [hereinafter PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTING].
95

See I.R.S. Pub. No. 4344, supra note 74, at 8.

96

See Treas. Reg.

§ 53.4944-3(b),

97 Compare, e.g., Treas. Reg.

ex. (18) & (19).

§ 53.4944-3(b),

ex. (11) with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200603031
(Oct. 25, 2005) (addressing qualifying distributions to commercial enterprise developing health
innovations). See also Sharon Schneider & Page Snow, Program Related Investments: An Overview,

FOUND. SOURCE 6 (2012), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/577434ede4fcb5f238e9b8b3/t/
586eaa3alb63lb755fe0925f/1483647546917/PRI+Overview+-+Foundation+Source.pdf (describing the
new examples when initially proposed as "based on private letter rulings published over the last several
decades").
98 See, e.g., THE PRI PULSE, VENN FOUNDATION 20 (2016) (reporting that over half of PRIs issued
by Minnesota foundations from 1998-2016 were for amounts of $100,000 or less).

99 See Treas. Reg.

§ 53.4958-6(a).
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At the same time, the law desires to allow transactions that will provide
public charities with valuable services or property on market or better terms
despite (and often by virtue of) insiders' involvement. To balance the risks
and benefits, tax law provides arrangements involving insiders with a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (and therefore acceptability under
the regulatory scheme) so long as they are approved by a disinterested body,
in reliance on information indicating comparable terms in the marketplace,
and are thoroughly and contemporaneously documented. 0 0
A similar, process-based approach could be used to create a safe harbor
that would give skittish foundations more comfort in making PRIs. New
Treasury regulations could design a rebuttable presumption that an
investment meets the PRI requirements if a foundation's board or investment
committee determined it met the PRI standard, relying on information from
a disinterested outsider indicating its terms would not be accepted by
conventional investors, and documenting both this and the investment's
contribution to achieving the foundation's charitable objectives. This
process-based approach would have the advantage of removing the need to
constantly update the terms of the statute or regulations to address new
investment structures.
It would also inject the objectivity of a disinterested third party into the
mix, calling on this entity to confirm a foundation's potentially self-serving
claim that an investment had no purpose to generate income or property
appreciation. But whether this system could be trusted by tax authorities
would depend on the gatekeepers. Like all regulatory approaches that rely on
third-party certification, they introduce a new set of regulation-relevant
parties, whose independence and expertise is crucial. In the PRI context,
however, there is a perhaps even more fundamental problem with introducing
such parties. They already exist in the form of attorneys offering written
opinions, and the cost of these parties is precisely the problem that a safe
harbor reform would be intending to solve. Indeed, the self-dealing
regulations provide a special rule for small organizations precisely to respond
to concerns about the cost a process-based safe harbor can impose.' 0 If the

100 Id.
" Id.

§ 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
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obstacle to foundation PRI uptake is its expense, it is hard to see how a safe
harbor approach on this model would eliminate it.
Would the government accept a PRI safe harbor without an appeal to
third parties for certification or confirmation that an investment met the
standard-one that relied on foundation findings alone? It is hard to see how
the government would tolerate such an alternative. After all, the public
charity self-dealing safe harbor itself was consciously limited in application
to public charities. The government could easily have applied it to private
foundations but chose not to-a decision unsurprising in light of the
government's persistent (and reasonable) concerns about foundations' lack
of accountability mechanisms.
Targeted rulemaking more specific than a safe harbor, but more
generalizable than new examples, is a helpful-and likely more feasiblealternative. Future Treasury regulations should address types and qualities of
transactions rather than specific hypotheticals. For example, regulations
could outline the qualities of permissible loan guarantees, rather than
particular allowable structures. A provision also could detail the
circumstances under which the existence of non-impact-oriented coinvestors would preclude PRI designation, rather than discussing a specific
compliant or non-compliant deal. Direct discussion of whether below-market
rates are always required would likewise be extremely welcome guidance.
Whether such clarifications will be forthcoming is highly uncertain
because the PRI designation is uniquely powerful. It not only prevents a
foundation investment from triggering jeopardizing investment and excess
business holding penalties, but also allows the investment to serve as a
qualifying distribution toward the annual 5% payout requirement. These
rules-rules PRIs flout-are key pillars of the 1969 Act. They work together
to cabin foundations within their societally acceptable limits. Relying on
foundations themselves to police them goes against the very core of the 1969
Act, creating a loophole that could undo much of the progress it seeded.
Indeed, understanding the regulatory potency of PIRs suggests the
government might see foundations' limited uptake of the tool as a feature of
the regulatory regime it has created for them, rather than a bug.
Alternatively, a self-regulatory option can also offer great potential to
increase PRI uptake. Foundations that make significant use of PRIs, many of
which are the very largest foundations, may feel comfortable taking the risk
of investing without a letter ruling. If they, however, begin as a matter of
course and field-building to seek such rulings and disseminate then, they
Pitt Tax Review IISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
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could make great strides in providing education, guidance, and comfort to
risk-averse foundations or those new to the PRI scene. There are foundations
that already have taken this costly but worthwhile approach. 10 2 Greater
coordination amongst them, and more publicity surrounding the results of the
rulings they obtain and their significance, could bring other foundations off
the proverbial bench.
2. Good Decision-Making
The possible solutions addressed above assume that uncertainty is to
blame for low PRI uptake. If more PRIs would instead be an inferior use of
foundation assets, these solutions would be counterproductive. As much as it
is in vogue, investing for impact is neither simple nor cheap. Investments that
generate social returns can rely upon innovative structures, novice managers
(either at the investee or fund level or both), limited liquidity, and multiple
types or tranches of investors. 103 Small foundations may well be making wise
decisions when they forego PRIs in favor of standard grants and traditional
investment portfolios to focus on charitable
impact and avoid adding to their
04
1
obligations.
overwhelming
already
PRIs may be too burdensome a prospect even for many larger
foundations with staffs. They generally employ individuals with expertise in
charitable grantmaking and investment management for pure financial
return. These employees will have neither the experience nor the capacity to
evaluate new structures, incentivize and monitor managers, and vet coinvestors who may or may not share an impact orientation. 10 5 Taking on a

112

See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20-06-100-20 (Dec. 13, 2005) (ruling that a foundation's

acquisition of a membership interest in a fund "organized for the purpose of investing in businesses in
low-income communities owned or controlled by members of a minority or other disadvantaged group
that have not been able to obtain conventional financing on reasonable terms, and that will provide
community benefits" would qualify as a PRI).
113 Cf Benjamin Leff, Preventing Private Inurement in Tranched Social Enterprises, 45 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1 (2015); Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Is Consistency the Hobgoblin of Little Minds: CoInvestment under Code Section 4941, 85 UMKC L. REV. 393 (2017).

...See Dan Parks, Many Small Foundations Wary of Impact Investing, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Mar. 2, 2020, https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Many-Small-Foundations-Wary-of/248163

(describing a new study showing small foundations do not have sufficient interest, capacity and/or risk
tolerance to engage in impact investing).
10 PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTING, supra note 94, at 5 (discussing the need for foundation staff
with financial expertise to make successful PRIs); ProgramRelated Investments, THE CENTER FOR HIGH
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new and complex form of investing may require so many administrative
resources that it is simply a poor fit.' 06
There are some, too, who would argue there is simply very little
charitable advantage to be gained from replacing grantmaking with
investment. Larry Kramer, a rare public skeptic of impact investing among
foundation leaders, has argued that "[t]hose impact investments that promise
to deliver market returns 'will attract the capital they need with or without
investors for whom social impact is an additional consideration. So we
decrease our grant-making power while adding no additional social
impact. '107 PRIs do allow for foundation assets to be (at least partially)
recycled and pursue charitable objectives multiple times, while grants
involve a certain 100% loss every time. Yet if there are in fact very few real
opportunities to primarily achieve charitable objectives while generating an
incidental financial return and many traps for the unwary, even large
foundations with dedicated staffs should rarely make PRIs.
After all, for those who seek access to a broad spectrum of impact
investments without the administrative costs and regulatory headaches of
squeezing them into the PRI category, alternatives exist. The founding of the
Chan Zuckerberg Initiative in 2015 1o shed light on the pre-existing practice
of elite philanthropists using limited liability companies to coordinate all or
part of their philanthropic activities.1 09 This practice has many advantages,
but one significant one is the regulatory freedom it offers for engaging in a
range of investment practices. Laurene Powell Jobs' LLC, the Emerson
Collective, purchased a "significant minority stake" in a firm called

IMPACT PHILANTHROPY, 10-11 (2016). See also Qu & Osili, supranote 83, at 315-20 (finding that larger
foundations with more staff invested more in PRIs and made more such individual investments).
10 See Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investing CreateRealImpact?, 11 STAN. Soc.
INNOV. REV. 22, 26 (2013).
.. See Marc Gunther, Hewlett Foundation 's Leader Makes a Case Against Impact Investing,

CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Hewlett-Foundation-sLeader/245394?cid=RCPACKAGE (quoting Kramer).
108

See Mark Zuckerberg, A Letter to Our Daughter, FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www

.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-letter-to-our-daughter/10153375081581634/.
109 See PAUL BREST, MONEY WELL SPENT 298 (2018); Dana Brakman Reiser, Disruptive
Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability Company, and the MillionaireNext Door, 70 FLA.

L. REv. 921 (2018).
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Anonymous Content, which produced the film Spotlight." This investment
fits poorly into the PRI category as conventional investors would and do
make similar investments. Such an investment might qualify as nonjeopardizing under the Treasury Guidance, but the size of the stake could
still present problems as an excessive holding. Philanthropic entities
operating as LLCs rather than as private foundations-not only Emerson, but
CZI, one half of the Omidyar Network, or the LLC that John and Laura
Arnold recently transitioned to using to manage their philanthropy" '-need
not concern themselves with ensuring their investments comply with these
rigid regulatory frameworks.
B. Mission-RelatedInvestment Uptake
Fewer and lower barriers remain for foundations seeking to engage in
mission-related investing, especially if one defines this term broadly to
include any investment tool aligning investment strategy with a foundation's
values and charitable objectives. After the 2015 Treasury Guidance's explicit
statement that "[w]hen exercising ordinary business care and prudence in
deciding whether to make an investment, foundation managers may consider
all relevant facts and circumstances, including the relationship between a
particular investment and the foundation's charitable purposes,"12 any
foundation should be able to find at least some investment vehicles that will
enhance value alignment. Even Kramer generally approves of foundations
investing in ESG mutual funds "as long as they don't sacrifice returns."ll3
That said, Treasury Guidance lacks the permanence of law. To express
the acceptance and value of mission-related investment even more strongly,
the statute should be amended to parallel the Guidance position. If legislative

110 Matthew Belloni, Laurene Powell Jobs Goes Hollywood, Buys Minority Stake in 'Spotlight'
Producer Anonymous Content, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 30, 2016, 7:37 AM), http://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/laurene-powell-jobs-takes-minority-934139.
... See

Ben
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Texas Billionaires Think
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BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-12/billionairesjohn-and-laura-arnold-s-data-driven-philanthropy; see also Ben Gose, John and LauraArnold Join Other
Billionaires in Move Away from Traditional Philanthropy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 28, 2019),

https://www.philanthropy.com/article/JohnLaura-Arnold-Join/245557.
112 Treasury Guidance, supra note 89, at 3.
113
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amendment is not politically feasible, at least the accompanying regulations
should be amended to conform with the 2015 Guidance.
Foundations could be moved more squarely into the impact camp in the
mission-related investment context by embracing even more fundamental
changes. For example, the limitation on excess business holdings could be
removed for mission-related investments, as it was for PRIs all the way back
in 1969. The policy concerns behind the excess business holdings caps map
quite poorly onto the terrain of mission-related investments. Concerns that
substantial business holdings would distract foundation managers from their
proper spheres of charitable concern or displace the production of charitable
benefits are muted if pursuit of an investment aligns with charitable mission.
The inclination to self-dealing the Treasury Report identified in excessive
holdings in related businesses could be addressed by retaining limits on even
mission-related investments if controlled by a foundation's own donors,
managers, or their relatives or controlled entities. Similarly, concerns about
the poor investment quality of substantial holdings in mission-related
investments could be dealt with through retained requirements for prudence,
diversification, and monitoring. Unfair competition issues might remain, but
considering the UBIT regime's comfort with excepting investment income
from even wholly unrelated businesses from taxation"'4 despite the
significant potential competitive effects thereof, it is hard to be overly
exercised about them.
Line-drawing is the real problem with creating an exception to the
excess business holdings rules for mission-related investment. In today's
business world, where every firm seems to tout its corporate social
responsibility and every fund manager is rushing a new ESG fund to market,
what kind of investment could not be treated as mission-related? Drafting
language to except mission-related investments from the excess business
holdings regime without gutting its remaining provisions in the process
would be extremely difficult. The difficulty faced by Newman's Own
Foundation in obtaining a statutory exception only for wholly owned,
independently-run businesses that donate all of their profits to charity

" See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (excluding from the definition of unrelated business taxable income "all
dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans ... amounts received or accrued as
consideration for entering into agreements to make loans, and annuities, and all deductions directly
connected with such income").
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demonstrates the uphill battle such an exception would face in seeking
congressional approval.
One possible way to thread this needle would be to impose an additional
regulatory burden on foundations seeking to use a potential MRI exception.
For example, statutory or regulatory language could impose monitoring and
documentation obligations on those seeking to use a mission-related
investment exception added to the excess business holdings regime. The
"expenditure responsibility" rules for foundation grants to non-public
charities offer one potential model. 115 They require a private foundation to
exert reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures to ensure the
grant is spent solely for the exempt purposes for which it was made, to obtain
documentation of how the
funds were spent, and "to make full and detailed
116
grants.
such
on
reports"
To maintain holdings in a business beyond the statutory maxima on
grounds the investment was mission-related, a foundation could likewise be
required not only to meet an MRI definition but also to track and document
the investment's achievements of its charitable objectives (or at least its
greater alignment with them relative to non-mission-related alternatives).
The challenge of this drafting exercise should not be underestimated. Setting
the hurdle high enough could address concerns about the potential breadth of
a mission-related investment definition. Yet, setting it too high would remove
its ability to spur greater uptake of mission-related investment in the first
place. The example of expenditure responsibility should give us pause.
Despite the seeming simplicity of its 11requirements,
many entities subject to
7
it prefer not to trigger its application.
An evaluation and documentation requirement of this type would be
independently valuable in updating the 1969 Act to adopt more impactfocused orientation. Much of the impact movement within philanthropy is
consumed with how to ensure and therefore measure impact. This metrics

115
Id. § 4945(h).
116See

id

11'
See Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Cooperatives: The First SocialEnterprise,66 DEPAUL L. REV.

1013, 1062 (2017) (noting that "[t]he expenditure responsibility requirements are extremely technical; as
a result, many private foundations will not make expenditure responsibility grants" and citing examples
of foundation statements refusing to do so).

Pitt Tax Review I ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2020.111 Ihp://taxreview.law.itt.edu

debate is heated, introducing questions about how to quantify impact and
compare incommensurables." 8 Addressing it comprehensively here is not
possible within the scope of this symposium contribution. Still, it is worth
noting that impact evaluation requirements are worthy of consideration for
possible adoption in the grantmaking context as well.
An even more ambitious change might not merely permit or encourage
mission-related investment but mandate it. The arguments for missionrelated investing are strong and cut to the core of the concerns to which the
1969 Act responded. Foundations are given significant advantages-tax and
otherwise-in recognition of their contributions to society. But if managed
as required to comply with the law, a foundation needs to spend only 5% of
its assets per year to support actual charitable activity. The data show that on
average, most foundations do act in precisely this way. U.S. foundations'
grantmaking and PRIs hover right around the mandatory 5 % floor."19
Could they not be doing more? The 5% number envisioned foundations
being able to roughly replace their spent assets though investment gains,
therefore allowing them to be sustainable in perpetuity. Even if one does not
seek to shake the potentially perpetual lifespan of foundations, could we not
ask foundations to do some good, something mission related, with their
remaining 95%? Mission-related investment is a way to do this. Demanding
that foundations align their investments-at least some of them-with their
values and their charitable missions would hardly be drastic. If the Treasury
is convinced such investments can be made without endangering
foundations' ability to carry on their charitable activities, mandating that
foundations enter this area is far from radical.
Requiring some charitable gains from the use of the remaining 95%
would also resonate with the spirit of the 1969 Act. Many at the time sought
even greater demands be put on foundation assets. The Treasury Report
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argued for a requirement to distribute all income. 120 Senator Gore advocated
limiting foundation lifetimes altogether,'121 encouraging foundations to spend
down in terms quite familiar to critics who argue against the perpetual life
charitable gift restrictions enjoy today.1 22 But one need not go any further
than the terms of the statute as enacted to find justification for demanding
more charitable impact from foundations. Its centerpiece imposed a payout
requirement, designed to ensure that private foundation assets reached
charitable programs.
Any attempt to draft legislation or regulations to mandate that
foundations engage in mission-related investing would need to contend with
two sets of objections. The first set is theoretical. Private foundations are
23
private, state-created organizations.1 The benefits received by foundations
and their donors are the means through which federal law can regulate them.
Critics already argue federal forays into nonprofit governance strain the
boundaries of this jurisdictional reach.1 24 Mandating how foundations choose
their investments, not to safeguard assets for future exempt use but instead to
conform to congressional or Treasury views on how to achieve a foundation's
charitable goals would indeed be a heavy hand on foundation autonomy.
Moreover, it would be federal interference with private state law
organizations, raising federalism concerns as well.
In addition to these more abstract concerns are practical ones. Imposing
a new mandate on foundations might further encourage donors to use
foundation alternatives, like donor-advised funds that are treated as public
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charities and the philanthropy LLC vehicles that escape the web of taxexempt legislation altogether. An MRI mandate would also be devilishly
difficult to draft. The Treasury Guidance is a good place to start. Legislation
or regulation could require, rather than simply permit "foundation managers
[to] consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including the relationship
between a particular investment and the foundation's charitable
",125
Such a broad statement, standing alone, would have significant
purposes.
expressive value in recognizing the value of mission-related investment.
Without more, and particularly some kind of standard for accountability and
enforcement, it is hard to see how such language would spur greater missionrelated investments than would the current permissive language. Process
requirements could be added, demanding documentation that foundations
engaged in such considerations, but it is hard to see how the IRS would
meaningfully enforce them.
The breadth of the mission-related investment umbrella, at least on some
definitions, is also a confounding factor. If a foundation could comply with
an MRI mandate simply by investing in ESG-focused mutual funds or
instructing its financial advisors to take such concerns to heart, the mandate
would devolve into a box-checking exercise scarcely worth the political
capital to enact. Mission-related investment could instead be defined to
require finding individual direct investments or funds that match precisely
with a foundation's mission, while still presenting a tolerable risk-return
profile in terms of safeguarding the foundation's assets. Conceived this way,
mandated MRI would be a costly and time-consuming process that would
take time away from other charitable pursuits (read-grantmaking) to which
many foundations and their staff would be far better suited. A mandate on
these terms would appropriately be confined to foundations with quite large
endowments,1 2 6 and would still raise significant enforcement challenges.
However an MRI mandate might be structured and its terms defined, it
also could not be created by regulation alone. Legislation is necessary, and
whether Congress has an appetite for taking up the challenges of drafting and
implementing a mandate remains to be seen. The permissive stance taken in
the 2015 Treasury Guidance seems to be moving the needle already. Perhaps
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no more will be required to spur the foundation community over time to
accept mission-related investment as a best practice.
IV. CONCLUSION

In a philanthropic world obsessed with impact, the question of how
foundations can align their investments with their values is fundamental. The
1969 Act's original PRI exception, as retrofitted with regulatory examples
over time, guides the use of investment as a substitute for grantmaking.
Recent Treasury Guidance on mission-related investment now also allows
foundations keen to engage in mission-related investment with their
endowments to keep better pace with innovations in the field.
Identifying these components of the 1969 Act that remain generative or
have been interpreted to allow them to continue to be useful also reveals
potentially beneficial additional updates. Some of this unfinished impact
business could be attended with incremental regulatory changes. Other
changes, particularly those that might increase the uptake of mission-related
investment, would likely require congressional intervention. The reform
proposals outlined here are only preliminary steps designed to spur further
research and lively debate. To design foundation regulations for today's age
of impact as influential and enduring as the 1969 Act will require both careful
study and deliberative and inclusive legislative and agency processes.
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